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ABSTRACT    
Th is article addresses how the Hungarian Central Bank gained autonomy in its operations from 
ruling politicians. While stressing the substantial infl uence of external actors in exercise of this 
reform, the article also demonstrates the limits of external infl uence by shedding light on the 
domestic political costs of this reform. Th e high costs of central bank reform in the calculations 
of the ruling politicians allowed the Central Bank of Hungary to gain partial operational 
autonomy in 1991, which fell short of fulfi lling the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession. Th e 
article discusses how partial reform furthered in Hungarian context by unpacking the interplay 
between domestic and external actors.  
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ÖZET
Bu makale, Macaristan Merkez Bankası’nın siyasi etkilerden kurtuluş ve operasyonel 
bağımsızlığını elde ediş sürecini irdelemektedir. Makalede, reformun gerçekleşmesinde dış 
aktörlerin yadsınamaz etkisine vurgu yapılmakla beraber, bu etkinin sınırları, özellikle iç 
siyasette bu reforma nasıl bakıldığının altı çizilerek tartışılmaktadır. Macaristan Merkez Bankası 
reformu, iktidardaki siyasetçiler açısından siyasi bedelinin yüksek olması sebebi ile 1991 yılında 
kısmen gerçeklemiş ve böylelikle Macaristan Merkez Bankası, Avrupa Birliğine (AB) üyelik 
için gerekli Kopenhag Kriterlerinin gerisinde kalmıştır. Bu makale, kısmen bağımsızlığını 
kazanan Macaristan Merkez Bankasının zaman içerisinde nasıl AB Kriterleri ile uyumlu hale 
geldiğini, iç ve dış politik aktörlerin karşılıklı etkileşimi üzerinden tartışılmaktadır.
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Do external actors have the coercive power to make domestic governments accede to 
institutional change, and thus, subordinate their economic policymaking power to an 
autonomous central bank, when such a decision is likely to clash with the electoral 
interests of ruling politicians? Th is article aims to respond to this broad question in the 
specifi c instance of Hungary by exploring the variation in the Hungarian Central Bank 
(Magyar Nemzeti Bank - MNB) autonomy since the 1990s in light of the EU accession 
criteria.
Central banking reforms are signifi cant institutional changes in monetary 
governance. An independent central bank restrains the hands of politicians in 
economic policymaking and thus aff ects their electoral chances. Ruling politicians, 
therefore, become reluctant to delegate their authority in monetary policymaking to 
this institution. By analyzing the underpinnings of central bank reform one can better 
understand “when” and “how” such a politically costly micro-institutional change 
occurs, and, equally important, “whether” the level of central bank autonomy varies 
over time. With its focus on the varying degrees of autonomy, this article demonstrates 
that central bank autonomy is not a dichotomy, but rather it is a spectrum, which 
makes us talk about altering levels of autonomy not just across countries but also 
within them. 
Th e article suggests that such institutional change is more likely to occur when 
international actors provide material incentives to domestic politicians. Domestic 
variables are essential to explain the extent of institutional change that takes place. In 
the Hungarian case, the international incentives provided by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) loans to achieve the transition to a market economy and the prospective 
European Union (EU) enlargement triggered the 1991 central bank reform. Back then, 
the interests of ruling politicians in Hungary did not converge towards the MNB`s 
priorities of low infl ation, low defi cit and lower debt. Th erefore, the politicians wanted 
to maintain as much power as they could to skew the power balance to themselves in 
monetary governance at the time of reform. Consequently, the central bank reform 
granted only partial autonomy for the MNB and fell short of fulfi lling the criteria set 
by the EU.  
Th is article argues that in case the interests of ruling politicians do not allow for 
more than a partial reform, the prospects for further change expand only when international 
institutions pressure non-compliant governments by withholding the incentives they yield. 
Th e EU accession talks with candidate states manifest a successful example of such pressure, 
as the EU refuses to grant membership to these states until they fulfi ll the required criteria 
fully and overcome all of their defi ciencies. It was due to the EU pressure that the MNB 
became compatible with its counterparts in the EU member states in 2001.
Th e Hungarian example holds important implications for diff usion of central 
bank independence (CBI) in emerging markets. Hungary is a representative case in that 
with its embracement of Western reform ideas in its post-communist stage from early 
on, an explanation of central bank reform in Hungary has the advantage of suggesting 
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inferences that can be generalized to other post-communist countries, such as Poland, 
Czech Republic and Slovakia that had similar starting conditions.1 Th e major weakness 
of the previous studies is that they do not problematize how much institutional change 
occurs after reform and, more importantly, whether this change alters over time. Th is 
article aims to fi ll this void with special reference to the Hungarian case.2 Additionally, the 
Hungarian case is an outlier in the sense that although the country was overwhelmingly in 
favor of emulating Western institutions at the time of transition to democracy and market 
economy, it took a long time for the MNB to become fully compatible with central banks 
of the EU member states.  
Th e article aims to contribute to international relations discipline by problematizing 
the role of international organizations in making micro-institutional change in monetary 
governance. In particular, it assesses when, how and to what extent international 
institutions are able to infl uence transformation of central banks in a domestic context. 
As we know, neoliberal institutionalism in international relations problematizes the 
restraining, regulating and coordinating infl uence of international organizations on state 
behavior by focusing on the role of incentives – in the form of fi nancial assistance, security 
and etc. – in making states act in a particular way.3 With its focus on the role of the EU 
conditionality that links institutional reform to membership, this article borrows from 
neoliberal approach to explain the statutory change at the MNB. Additionally, the article 
addresses the self-interested and cost-benefi t calculation based action on the part of ruling 
politicians to explain the variation in the MNB’s autonomy over time and hence, domestic 
compliance with external actors’ demands.
Th e article is organized as follows. Th e fi rst section outlines why CBI is important 
in an age of globalization with reference to international organizations. Th e second 
1 Given space limit, the article is able to trace the causal process in the Hungarian case only. As 
for the weakness stemming from single case study, variation in the dependent variable through 
intracase comparison assists in overcoming the selection bias and helps to increase the external 
validity of the argument. 
2 For good works on issue of CBI in developing countries, see Caner Bakir “Policy Entrepreneur-
ship and Institutional Change: Multilevel Governance of Central Banking Reform”, Govern-
ment: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, Vol. 22, No. 4, October 
2009, p. 571-598; Rachel A. Epstein, In Pursuit of Liberalism: International Institutions in Post-
communist Europe, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 2008; Simone Polillo and Mauro 
F. Guillen, “Globalization Pressures and the State: Th e Worldwide Spread of Central Bank 
Independence”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 110, 2005,  p. 764–1802; and Sylvia Maxfi eld, 
Gatekeepers of Growth: Th e International Political Economy of Central Banking, New Jersey, Princ-
eton University Press, 1997. Among these works, Bakir’s article stands out with its focus on how 
much independence has occurred after the reform. His article is single case study and it deals 
with CBI in Turkey.
3 For some prominent works in the literature, see Celeste A. Wallander, “Institutional Assets and 
Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War”, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4, Autumn 
2000, p. 705-773; Andrew Moravcsik and Milada Anna Vachudova, “National Interests, State 
Power, and EU Enlargement”, East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2003, p. 42–57; 
Judith Kelley, Ethnic Politics in Europe: Th e Power of Norms and Incentives, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2004. 
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section addresses major explanations on CBI in the literature and why they cannot take 
us very far in understanding the mechanisms by which this specifi c change occurs in 
diff erent contexts, including Hungary. Th e third section provides a theoretical framework 
to explain CBI in emerging markets of the EU zone in general and in Hungarian context 
in particular. Th e fi nal section discusses the variation in Hungarian Central Bank since 
1990 along the theoretical argument.
Why Does Central Bank Autonomy Matter in Current Times?
In the early 1990s, when international fi nancial institutions and advanced capitalist 
countries threw their support behind fi nancial liberalization, the expectation was that 
integration with global fi nancial markets would enable states gain access to wider pool of 
capital and thus would compensate for their lower domestic savings rates. Consequently, 
fi nancial liberalization would lead to faster investment, higher output and therefore faster 
growth and greater effi  ciency.4 Yet, what most of the countries got in return for opening 
up their capital accounts were short-term infl ows, which were not only unfavorable to 
long-term investments but also highly volatile in the presence of rapid move of capital. In 
an attempt to fi nely balance the benefi ts and risks of fi nancial liberalization, proponents of 
neoliberalism recognized that a strong regulatory framework with its built-in automatic 
stabilizers and strong safety nets is essential to allow countries to better absorb the shocks.5 
Th e emphasis on increasing the regulatory capacity of the state called for building key 
institutions in emerging markets, such as autonomous bank supervision agencies, and 
above all independent central banks.6 
As the East Asian crisis illustrated the dangers of weak regulation of fi nance, the 
preconditions for prudent fi nancial liberalization became stringent in the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) programs as the Fund started to demand institutional reforms 
for regulation in exchange for its economic support.7 Th e concern with enhancing the 
regulatory capacity of states in an age of fi nancial liberalization was apparent also in 
the enlargement framework of the EU as the organization emphasized an autonomous 
central bank, besides other supervision institutions for its prospective members in Central 
4 For advantages of fi nancial liberalization in emerging markets, see Peter Kingstone, “Why Free 
Trade Losers Support Free Trade: Industrialists and the Surprising Politics of Free Trade Re-
form in Brazil”, Comparative Political Studies Vol. 34, 2001, p. 986-1010; Lawrence Summers, 
“International Financial Crises: Causes, Prevention, and Cures,” American Economic Review, 
Articles and Proceedings, Vol. 90, May 2000, p. 1-16.
5 Joseph Stiglitz, “Capital Market Liberalization, Economic Growth and Instability”, World De-
velopment, Vol. 8, No. 6, 2000, p. 1075-1086.
6 John Williamson, “Development and the Washington Consensus”, World Development, Vol. 21, 
1993, p. 1232-1239.
7 For a detailed discussion of what the IMF required the East Asian countries to change in the 
aftermath of the crisis for better regulation of fi nance, see Gregor Irwin and David Vines, “In-
ternational Policy Advice in the East Asian Crisis: A Critical Review of the Debate”, Dipak 
Dasgupta and David Wilson (eds.), Capital Flows Without Crisis? Reconciling Capital Mobility 
and Economic Stability, London, Routledge, 2001, p. 58-73.
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and Eastern Europe in the pursuit of establishing a well-functioning internal market.8   In 
line with the increased interest in prudential regulation and its institutions, the works on 
merits of an independent central bank multiplied in the literature.9   
Major Explanations of CBI in the Literature and Th eir Problems
Sectoral Groups as Demanders 
Th is approach problematizes the political strength of diff erent sectoral groups and argues that 
central bank autonomy is likely only when there is a coalition of interests in society that are 
politically capable of protecting it. In the literature, Posen is known for his fi rm support for the 
society-centered approach.10 Accordingly, central bank independence is possible when societal 
actors such as fi nance capital that benefi t from low infl ation support it. Recently, Jacoby made 
a similar argument and argued that “for eff ective institutional change to persist and perform, it 
must be pulled in by societal actors, rather than decreed by policy-makers alone.”11
Scholars arguing from the societal actors’ perspective draw heavily upon sectoral 
interests and preferences. Although this approach makes us look at the issue from the 
side of “policy demanders”, it would be a fallacy to portray politicians as passive yes-men. 
Rather, an explanation that elucidates how politicians decide on their policy choices in the 
presence of diff erent constituency demands and heterogeneous preferences over monetary 
and fi scal policies needs to be stated. Th is article aims to accomplish this goal. Additionally, 
the explanation suff ers from empirical weaknesses. In post-communist European states, 
central banks managed to obtain their independence and maintain it although they have 
long been weakly supported by domestic groups.12
8 See the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (1992) for the re-
quirements on the current members of the EU back then for fi nancial regulation in detail. Also, 
see the EU Single Market White Article (1995) and economic conditions of the EU Copenha-
gen criteria (1993) for the requirements that the CEECs had to fulfi ll in pre-accession era. Th e 
latter documents mention the institutions that the prospective members states need to develop 
in the pursuit of well-functioning market economy.
9 Many studies on central bank independence have revealed strong and positive correlations be-
tween central bank independence and lower infl ation rates in advanced markets. See Alexander 
Alesina and Lawrence Summers, “Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Perfor-
mance: Some Comparative Evidence”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 25, 1993, 
p. 151-62; Sylvester Eijffi  nger and Jakob De Haan, Th e Political Economy of Central Bank In-
dependence, Princeton, Princeton University, 1996. Th e benefi ts of central bank independence, 
however, are not limited to decreasing infl ation. As Mosley argues, given investors’ preferences 
for healthy macro-indicators, delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank 
can help governments enhance investors’ confi dence and, thus, lower the likelihood of capital 
outfl ows. For details, see Layna Mosley, Global Capital and National Governments Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, chapter 4.
10 Adam Posen, “Do Better Institutions Make Better Policy? Review”, International Finance, 
Blackwell Publishing, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1998, p. 173-205.
11 Wade Jacoby, Imitation and Politics: Redesigning Modern Germany, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 2001.
12 See Juliet Johnson, “Postcommunist Central Banks: A Democratic Defi cit?” Journal of De-
mocracy, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2006, p. 90-103.
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Partisanship Arguments
In the literature partisanship arguments shed light on the link between the political parties 
and the central bank status. Way, for instance, argues that leftist governments intervene 
extensively in the economy to infl uence market outcomes and redistribute income. 
Consequently, where left-leaning parties dominate government, an independent central 
bank is likely to clash with the partisan goals of these governments and therefore, left party 
governance lowers the chances of an independent central bank.13 Empirically, however, we 
know that this is not true. Under the Social Democrat government of Gonzales, Spain 
granted autonomy to its central bank in 1994. 
Th e literature on the preferences of right parties does no better. Th e conventional view 
in the literature claims that where right-wing parties dominate, the government’s relatively 
restrictive, noninterventionist strategies enhance the autonomy of central banks.14 In emerging 
markets, however, these arguments become dubious given that right-wing governments could 
be populist and hence, refrain from losing their fi scal power. In Hungary, the right-wing 
coalition government in early 1990s constitutes an example of such parties and based on their 
institutional preference of a partially independent central bank, one can suggest that arguments 
developed for the advanced economies might not always hold for other markets. 
Coalitional Arguments
Coalitional arguments suggest that governments made up of multiple political parties 
prefer an independent central bank so as to use its credibility to prevent any intraparty 
dispute over monetary policy that can lead to a cabinet collapse. In multiparty governments, 
monetary policy decisions are made in one ministry, usually the fi nance ministry. Th en 
disagreements about the course of monetary policy within a coalition government, where 
one party has the most information and/or expertise about policy, can make the coalition 
collapse.15 Bernhard and Leblang argue that an independent monetary institution can 
increase the cabinet durability for coalition governments by taking away the monetary 
policy instrument tool that the governments can manipulate.16 
Th is argument encounters empirical weaknesses. In Hungary, all governments 
throughout the 1990s have been coalition governments, but instead of delegating authority 
to the MNB – as this argument would expect – they all chose to keep it as dependent as 
possible. Th e situation was no diff erent in Poland. When the social democrat-led coalition 
government came to power after the 1993 elections, it called for changing the status of the 
Central Bank of Poland to make it less independent.17
13 For details see Christopher Way, “Central Banks, Partisan Politics, and Macroeconomic Out-
comes”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2, March 2000, p. 196-224.
14 Please refer to William Bernard, Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Indepen-
dence in Industrial Democracies, Ann Harbor, University of Michigan Press, 2002 for right-wing 
parties’ preferences in European context.
15 For a detailed discussion, see Lucy Goodhart, Political Institutions and Monetary Policy, unpub-
lished manuscript, Harvard University, 2000.
16 William Bernhard and David Leblang, “Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate Commit-
ments”, International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 1, 1999, p. 71-97.
17 For details, see Rachel Epstein, “Cultivating Consensus and Creating Confl ict: International 
It Takes Two to Tango
135
Economic Openness Arguments         
In contrast to the domestic level explanations, the economic openness argument as 
suggested by Maxfi eld18 holds that, in middle-income countries, governments choose to 
grant autonomy to their central banks as this helps lower expectations of infl ation and 
reduce the cost of borrowing in international markets. Accordingly, the more an economy 
is fi nancially integrated with world markets, the more likely it is that government’s need 
for fi nance will yield CBI since only through delegating authority to the central bank, 
as Maxfi eld claims, can politicians signal to foreign investors that the government is 
committed to “desirable” (read as non-infl ationary) economic policies.
Despite its plausibility, the “creditworthiness” argument of Maxfi eld is problematic 
in the sense that most of the countries that opted for a statutory change, in her analysis, were 
also being monitored by international institutions in those years. Hence, it is possible to argue 
that it was these institutions, rather than the search for international creditworthiness in 
global markets, that triggered a central bank reform in these countries. Th is is most apparent 
in the case of Eastern and Central European countries since these countries were under 
the IMF stabilization program to become full market economies in the 1990s. As the East 
Asian crisis in 1997 illustrated the dangers of weak regulation of fi nance, the preconditions 
for prudent fi nancial liberalization became stringent in the IMF programs. In exchange for 
its economic support, the Fund called for building key institutions, such as autonomous bank 
supervision agencies, and above all independent central banks in developing countries.19 
Besides the IMF, one should also consider the role of the EU in understanding the statutory 
reform in these countries, since in the early 1990s there was already a hard-won consensus 
to institutionalize central bank independence in the European Community. Maxfi eld’s 
explanation fails to rule out this competing argument.
What Explains the Central Bank Legal Reform in the EU Candidate 
Countries? 
In contrast to the domestic level explanations that dominate the literature or purely 
system-level explanations, this article builds on a bourgeoning literature that combines 
international and domestic explanatory variables to account for central bank reform. 
Th is article rests upon the idea that without material incentives off ered by international 
organizations, it is unlikely for politicians to consider a change in the status of their central 
banks. Th ese “incentives” can be either economic, referring to loans that help support 
domestic economy, or political, which takes the form of accession to key regional blocs. 
Th e role of international incentives is essential as ruling politicians lack any incentive 
Institutions and the (De)Politicization of Economic Policy in Postcommunist Europe”, Com-
parative Political Studies, Vol. 39, No. 8, October 2006, p. 1019-1042.
18 For theoretical discussion on the link between economic openness and central bank autonomy, 
see Maxfi eld, Gatekeepers of Growth, p.35-50.
19 For an excellent discussion on the IMF’s institutional requirements that developing countries 
need to fulfi ll for economic aid, see Williamson, “Development and the Washington Consen-
sus”, p. 1232-1239.
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to consider a change in the status of their central bank for a couple of reasons. First, an 
autonomous central bank is unlikely to monetarize government defi cits. In addition, an 
autonomous central bank is a restraint on the level of spending that a fi scally expansionist 
government plans to implement due to its control over money supply and its focus on price 
stability in economy. Th is is why a “push factor” by international organizations becomes 
necessary to make ruling politicians consider a statutory change in their central bank.   
When it comes to central bank reform in Europe, it is the IMF and the EU that 
exert pressure on states by conditionally linking necessary reform in the status of central 
bank to the particular reward they wield, whether this be a signifi cant amount of loan or full 
membership in the union.20 It is important that the incentives off ered by the international 
institutions must not be free; in the issue area of central banking, conditionality means 
that politicians have to reform the status of their central bank in order to receive the 
particular incentive in place. Equally important, the ruling politicians in question must 
view this incentive benefi cial enough to choose to comply with its condition. Th at is to 
say, ruling politicians should be dependent on this incentive so that benefi ts of compliance 
outweigh costs of defi ance for them. Th is article argues that when both of these conditions 
(conditionality and dependence) are present, international incentives are able to initiate 
this micro-institutional change (see Table 3). 
While material incentives off ered by international actors explain “when” and “how” 
central bank reform is initiated, they are, on their own, insuffi  cient to determine “how 
much” institutional change occurs. As previously noted, in Hungary the initial reform in 
1991 failed to result in a strongly autonomous central bank in its operations, despite the 
IMF pressure and the prospective EU membership. Th us, the presence of international 
material incentives is no guarantee that the resultant reform will lead to a bank that is 
fully independent of political pressures in its operations. Hence, some other explanation 
is necessary to understand why countries might fail to comply fully with external actors’ 
demands in the fi rst place.   
Th is article claims that, in the absence of government commitment to diminish the 
underlying causes of budget defi cit and infl ation in an economy, the ruling politicians will 
be hesitant to accept a fully autonomous central bank as they need to rely on the central 
bank’s resources to monetarize their defi cits. Moreover, they will be unfriendly to the idea 
of restraining their fi scal spending in line with infl ation targets set by an autonomous 
party. Hence, the level of central bank autonomy is likely to increase, when government is 
willing to converge towards the central bank goals of low infl ation and low defi cit in its 
economic policies (see Table 3). 
20 For IMF conditionality see James Vreeland, Th e IMF and Economic Development, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003 and for the EU-based conditionality, refer to Mileda Anna 
Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2005; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by 
Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe”, 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2004, p. 661-679.
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However, disinfl ationary policies can be highly unpopular with the masses in 
a national setting. When ruling politicians cannot derive support from their electoral 
constituencies for disinfl ationary policies, they then fi nd themselves confronted with a 
severe dilemma: while international incentives at interstate level require them to undertake 
central bank reform, the political costs of this institutional reform on the domestic level 
make these actors reluctant to proceed. What happens then? In the light of Hungarian 
case, this article argues that when the policy priorities of governments and central bank 
do not match, ruling politicians undertake a partial change to maintain as much power 
as possible in their hands vis-à-vis the central bank. When the reform falls short of 
satisfying the EU’s accession criteria, pressure from the EU becomes necessary to ensure 
full compliance.    
Table 1 Depiction of Th eoretical Argument and its Application to the Hungarian Case
Th e question that needs to be addressed here is how the EU defi nes and 
operationalizes central bank independence in candidate states for accession and in turn, 
what partial reform stands for. Based upon the documents of the organization, in order 
for a candidate state to have full alignment with the EU criteria, and thus, a strongly 
autonomous central bank, the central bank needs to set price stability as its key objective; 
it should be prohibited from lending to the government at any cost; it should have the 
discretion to determine the instruments of monetary policy, meaning interest rates as they 
aff ect level of investment, infl ation and the amount of capital infl ows coming into the 
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country – and exchange rates, which are critical for the competitiveness of the economy.21 
In this article, anything that falls between no legal autonomy and full alignment with the 
EU criteria is considered to be partial reform, where the bank enjoys limited autonomy 
from ruling politicians (see Table 2).
Table 2 Defi ning and Operationalizing the Dependent Variable
Variation in the MNB’s autonomy 
    Th e level of independence the MNB holds from political interference and pressure over time
Operationalization:
- Is price stability set as its key objective?
- Is the Bank prohibited from lending to the government at any cost? 
- Does the Bank have the discretion to determine the instruments of monetary policy, i.e. interest rates and 
exchange rates 
Table 3 Defi ning and Operationalizing the Independent Variables
Incentives provided by international institutions
    Economic and/or political benefi ts off ered to the negotiator state
Operationalization:
- Th e condition of amending the status of central bank is stated explicitly and prominently in the 
treaty or in the program of international institution(s) 
- Th e politicians demonstrate willingness to sign or conclude an agreement with the international 
institution to obtain the incentive it off ers
Domestic Political Costs of an Autonomous Central Bank
    Th e costs of proceeding with disinfl ationary policies in order to ameliorate macroeconomic 
instabilities prevailing in the economy
 Operationalization:
- Is there an electoral support for such an economic policy?
Th e argument introduced here diff ers from constructivist arguments to CBI. 
Epstein, in her book on central bank independence in post-communist Europe, refers to 
constructivism by arguing that international institutions maximize their infl uence over 
domestic reform when domestic actors –who are uncertain about how to make policy 
21  For details, see Maastricht Treaty and the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of 
Central Bank and of the European Central Bank-constituting a part of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community. Article 105 of the Treaty and Article 2 of the Protocol talk about 
price stability in particular, while Article 108 of the Treaty and Article 7 of the Protocol defi ne 
the rules on the prohibition of national central bank from taking instructions from govern-
ments. Additionally, certain provisions of the Maastricht Treaty as well as Article 22 of the 
Protocol talk about prohibition of “monetary fi nancing and privileged access”. Th at is, they 
defi ne as illegal overdraft facilities or any type of credit facility between a national central bank 
and governments/public authorities, as well as prohibit the Bank from direct purchases from 
public sector entities. Finally, any fi nancing of public sector obligations vis-à-vis third parties is 
proscribed. Th e EU also demands, although in lesser extent, provisions on security of tenure of 
members of the national central bank’s decision-making bodies, mentioned in Article 14.2 of 
the Protocol. For original documents visit: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_
and_monetary_aff airs/institutional_and_economic_framework/o10001_en.htm.
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- seek association with the values and status embodied by the international institutions 
that are undertaking policy transfer.22 Diff erent from the argument off ered here, Epstein 
suggests that politicians accede to demands of international institutions because of 
non-material factors of salience of approval and the need for social association at times 
of transition, when politicians are uncertain about what best serves their interest. Th e 
discussion of the Hungarian case below demonstrates why the competing argument of 
Epstein does not hold.
Re-thinking the Variation in Central Bank Autonomy in Hungary
Th e fi rst legal reform to supply the MNB legal autonomy for the fi rst time in its history 
occurred in 1991 in the presence of external actors and the material incentives they 
wielded.23 In the aftermath of the downfall of communism, “Return to Europe” quickly 
became the major slogan of transition in Hungary and it implied that integration into 
the West European and Atlantic organizations, namely the EU and NATO, would 
constitute the major foreign goal of the country in this new era. Th e Western European 
governments, on the other hand, while reluctant to openly commit themselves to a quick 
eastward enlargement of the EU, were not indiff erent to developments there. Very quickly, 
the EU extended some programs that would assist the transformation process in Eastern 
Europe to signal its interest in the region’s future. In Hungarian context, these signals 
involved the Phare Program (1989) and the Association Agreement (1991). Although 
they mainly aimed at supporting the establishment of a liberal economy by providing 
expertise and fi nancial aid,24 in Hungary as well as elsewhere in the region, such measures 
were interpreted as signals of the EU`s willingness to admit the newly liberal democrat 
states of Eastern Europe into its club.25
22 Epstein’s argument resembles Woods’ argument in the sense that Woods also considers in-
ternational organizations’ capacity to transmit policy through ideas and technical expertise in 
times of uncertainty. Diff erent from Epstein, Woods problematizes the role of sympathetic 
decision-makers at domestic level to persuade governments to emulate international organiza-
tions` solutions. For details of Epstein’s argument, see Epstein, In Pursuit of Liberalism, p. 1-32. 
For Woods’ argument, see Ngaire Woods, Th e Globalizers: Th e IMF, Th e World Bank, and Th eir 
Followers, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2006, p. 65-83.
23 In the 1990s, not just the central bank but whole banking sector in Hungary was reformed. For 
an account of banking sector reform, see Gyorgy Szapary, “Banking Sector Reform in Hungary: 
Lessons Learned, Current Trends and Prospects”, paper presented at Th e Seventh Dubrovnik 
Economic Conference, Croatia, 28-30 June, 2001.
24 Th e EU signed Association Agreements with Visegrad countries of Hungary, Poland and back 
then what was called Czechoslovakia in November/December 1991. However, the formal launch-
ing of these agreements did not happen until the Essen Summit of December 1994. At Essen, 
Association agreements turned into European Agreements, providing economic and technical 
cooperation, fi nancial assistance and the creation of a structured political dialogue to help these 
countries achieve full membership. In many cases, funding was provided through the Phare Pro-
gram, which earmarked 582.8 million ECU between 1990-1995. With the extension of Phare 
to additional recipients, Hungary’s share declined from 20% in 1990 to 8.6% in 1994, by which 
time the funding had stabilized at around one billion ECU. For details of Phare Program, refer to 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/phare_legislation_and_ publications_en.htm.
25 According to Andor, the rulers of the ex-socialist countries strongly believed that the EU would 
automatically include them. Indeed, one can hardly blame them for their contentions given 
in Copenhagen Summit of 1993 the EU announced that the Association Agreements would 
eventually lead to full membership. For details see Lazlor Andor, Hungary on the Road to the 
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It is important to note here that despite its fi nancial help, the EU did not preoccupy 
itself with overseeing the economies of these countries, as there was a conscious decision 
in the EU to leave the guiding role of transition to the IMF. Th e governments in transition 
states, on the other hand, had no objections to the involvement of the IMF in their 
economies as they saw this as compatible with their attempts to join the EU. Hungary was 
no exception. At a time when the country was seeking the political recognition of the EU 
as an offi  cial candidate, Hungarian politicians had all the incentives to follow the IMF 
prescriptions to make the country’s candidacy stronger. More importantly, Hungary was 
dependent on the economic assistance that the IMF could provide in early 1990s due to 
imbalances in its external position.26
As this article argues, the material incentives provided by external actors (IMF 
economic loans in the short term and the EU membership in the long term) triggered 
a central bank reform in Hungarian context. Th e enactment of the new central bank 
law was premised on two assumptions: First, the law would help the country strengthen 
its position vis-à-vis the EU in its push for candidate status by demonstrating its 
commitment to institutional requirements of a well-functioning market economy. After 
all, undertaking a central bank reform would help Hungary fulfi ll an important condition 
of the Maastricht Treaty, which has set central bank independence as the norm for the 
EU states. Secondly, and more urgently, the Act would help Hungary fulfi ll the conditions 
stated in its stand-by agreement with the Fund to receive economic assistance, necessary 
to correct its external imbalances.
Although the new law granted autonomy to the bank for the fi rst time in its history, the 
change was partial in EU terms as the bank lacked the right of not fi nancing the state defi cit. 
Nor the MNB was able to openly target price stability as its primary goal. Instead, the priority 
of the bank was now a rather vague goal of defending “the value of the national currency.” Th e 
major benefi ts of the reform in economic sphere involved empowering the MNB in formulation 
of monetary policy as the Act formalized its preeminence in using the monetary tools.27        
Th e partialness of the reform stemmed from the fi scal stand of the newly elected, 
fi rst democratic government, which can be characterized by its accommodative stand to the 
growing defi cit–despite the discontent of the IMF. After all, what brought the conservative 
right-wing coalition government of Antall to power was its declared commitment to “market 
socialism”, which promised a smooth transition to neoliberal economy, without sacrifi cing 
European Union: Transition in Blue, Connecticut, Praeger, 2000, p. 73-115.
26 As the gross foreign debt constituted almost 57% of the GNP, Hungary did not have an option 
but ask for the IMF’s help in its transition stage. For a good account of the Hungarian economy 
at the onset of transition process, see David Barlett, Th e Political Economy of Dual Transforma-
tions: Market Reform and Democratization in Hungary, Ann Harbor, Th e University of Michigan 
Press, 1997, p. 35-76.
27 Th e MNB was allowed to lower or raise the exchange rates up to a certain level (5%), above 
which it was required to seek the approval of the government. Hence, it had pretty much fl ex-
ibility to alter the exchange rates on its own. Additionally, the MNB had the power to set 
interests rates at its own.
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the welfare provisions.28 Th e heavy cost of fi nancing the welfare state was apparent in fi gures; 
at the onset of transition, total social expenditures were exceeding 25% of GDP and in 
1992, 4.2 million workers were supporting 2.7 million pensioners in the country. Th us, 
the maintenance of communist regime’s social security benefi ts was exerting a substantial 
pressure on the government budget. In the presence of rising unemployment and increasing 
prices, Hungarian people resented the costs of adjustment.29 Given the massive discontent 
with market reforms, proceeding with large-scale adjustments in welfare state would prove 
to be costly for the Antall government in electoral terms.
As this article suggests, in the absence of electoral support for disinfl ation policies, 
the domestic political costs of central bank reform remained high because the government 
was unwilling to lose its control on MNB`s resources due to its dependence on the MNB’s 
resources to fi nance its debt. Consequently, the 1991 Central Bank Act did not entirely 
eliminate the direct fi nancing of government but limited it to 4% of annual tax recipients, 
which would decline to 3% by 1994. Despite its incompleteness, however, the reform 
allocated some maneuvering space to the MNB in its relationship with the government 
for the fi rst time in its history. When the Antall government appealed to the bank for 
special fi nancing lines to support the major loss-making state economic enterprises in 
1991, the bank was able to turn down these appeals. 
In the mid-1990s, the risk of a serious economic crisis arising from Hungary’s 
fi scal and current account defi cit made the subsequent left-liberal coalition government 
led by Horn realize early on that Hungary had reached the limits of the “possible”.30 In 
1994, the current account defi cit stood at a historically high level of 9% of the GDP, 
while the budget defi cit constituted approximately 7% of the GDP. Moreover, the budget 
defi cit displayed a continuously widening trajectory; in March 1995 the government has 
28 Under the communist regime retirement age was low; women could retire at 55 and men at 
60. Th ese provisions became the target of the IMF with the downfall of the regime. Although 
the government in October 1991 proposed an increase in retirement age, it back paddled 
soon after. In healthcare, the government was again reluctant to address the problems and 
undertake draconian changes. No reforms were made in areas involving co-payments for 
medical treatment and medicine, overcapacity of hospital beds and so on. As for education, no 
increase in tuition fees was adopted. For a detailed discussion, see Frank Bonker, Th e Political 
Economy of Fiscal Reform In Central Eastern Europe, Cheltenham, UK, Edward Elgar, 2006, p. 
102-104.
29 Antall realized early on how hard it would be to proceed with necessary structural reforms; after 
his attempt to increase the energy prices as part of price liberalization process in late 1990, 
“gas riots” – the most extensive street demonstrations since 1956- broke out in diff erent 
cities of Hungary, which made Antall government to drop the idea quickly. In the presence 
of rising unemployment and increasing prices, Hungarian people resented the costs of ad-
justment. 
30 Th e coalition government was formed by the left-wing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and 
the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDSZ) under the leadership of the former in 1994. 
Th e government represented the left-liberal camp and modifi cation of political positions. For 
details on this government, see Umut Korkut, Liberalization Challenges in Hungary: Elitism, 
Progressivism and Populism, New York, Palgrave MacMillan, 2012, p. 38-41 and Gabor Toka, 
“Hungary”, Sten Berglung, Th omas Hellen and Frank Aarebrot (eds.), Handbook of Political 
Change in Eastern Europe, Cheltenham, Edgar Elgar, 1998, p. 255.
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already reached half of the annual plan budget defi cit. As a result, the Horn government 
announced in March 1995 an austerity program, known as the Bokros Package, to cut 
down the budget defi cits and control the infl ation.31 
In the absence of electoral support for disinfl ation, it was politically costly for the 
Horn government to launch it. After all, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) under 
Horn represented the “losers” of the transition – pensioners, blue-collar workers and public 
sector employees.32 Th e risk of crisis, however, left the government with no choice but 
proceed with severe measures to gain the seal of approval from the IMF and avoid the crisis. 
Additionally, the Horn government calculated that the targeted reduction of the public debt 
with the Bokros Package would improve the country’s prospects for the EU accession.33 Th e 
prudent disinfl ationary posture of the government facilitated further change in the MNB`s 
autonomy along the EU criteria. Th e Central Bank Act in 1996 required that the Bank 
would no longer provide credit to the government – apart from a small temporary facility.34
Th e launching of accession negotiations in 1998 motivated the succeeding 
conservative coalition government under the premiership of Orban to qualify Hungary to 
join the EU during his tenure.35 In contrast to the fi scal expansionism of the early years in 
offi  ce, Orban made a shift in his economic policies and adopted a tight stand as the recession 
in world markets hit the country after 2000 and undermined the viability of the export-led 
trajectory for growth. Consequently, Orban decided to side with non-tradable sectors, which 
included, above all, property and construction businesses for economic growth and represent 
their interests in offi  ce.36 As these groups pressed for fi scal discipline in order to pay lower 
taxes and social security contributions, Orban responded with cuts in spending. His policies 
helped him gain credibility as the EU was closely watching the fi scal health of the country. 
31 According to the Package, defi cits would be lowered through cutting real wages by 12% for 
workers in public sector and reducing the civil service employment by 15%. For details, please 
refer to David Barlett,Th e Political Economy, ch. 6.
32 Faced with the dilemma of how to declare the austerity package without alienating support-
ers, the reformist left-wing MSZP advocated the adoption of “making liberal policies now and 
social policies later” solution, which made the timing of social policies dependent on economy 
recovery. See Diana Morlang, “Hungary: Socialists Building Capitalism”, Th e Left Transformed 
in Post-Communist Societies, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefi eld Publishers, Inc., 2003, p. 61-99. 
33 At the Copenhagen Meeting of the European Council in June 1993, the European Council 
decided that the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe could become members 
of the European Union as soon as they were able to fulfi ll the relevant political and economic 
obligations.
34 Please refer to Carlo Cottarelli, “Hungary: Economic Policies for Sustainable Growth”, IMF 
Occasional Article no.159, Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1998 for details. Th e ar-
ticle is also available at http://www.imf.org/external/country/hun/index.htm?type=42.
35 Th e government was made up of three right-wing parties of the leading Hungarian Civic Union 
(Fidesz), Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and Independent Smallholders’ Party (FKGP). 
For details on the position of government and the identity transformation of Fidesz from a 
liberal into a conservative party, see Korkut, Liberalization Challenges in Hungary, p.46-47 and 
Agnes Batory, “Th e Political Context of EU Accession in Hungary”, Th e Royal Institute of Inter-
national Aff airs, Briefi ng Paper, November 2002, p.4. 
36 See Bela Greskovits, “Th e First Shall Be the Last? Hungary’s Road to EMU”, Kenneth Dyson 
(ed.), Enlarging the Euro Area: External Empowerment and Domestic Transformation in East Cen-
tral Europe, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 178-197.
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To lower the opposition from society, the change in posture was presented to the masses as 
a price to pay on the thorny road to EU membership. As this article argues, in the presence 
of constituency support, the government committed itself to tight fi scal policies for lower 
defi cit and lower infl ation. Once the policy priorities of the MNB and the government 
converged, the government quickly carried out remaining statutory changes in the MNB to 
align it with the EU criteria. In July 2001 came the fi nal revisions in the MNB`s statute that 
made the Bank compatible with its counterparts in the EU zone.
Table 4 Variation in Central Bank Autonomy in Hungary
Hungary Incentives DomesticCosts
Central Bank
Independence
1990-1994
government 
(MDF+FKGP+KDNP)
Present
- IMF Stand-By
Agreement
-EU Enlargement-
(candidacy status
in 1994)
High costs
- no constituency
support for
disinfl ationary
policies
Partial Autonomy
(1991 Central
Bank Act)
1994-1998
government
(MSZP+SZDSZ)
Present
- EU Candidacy
High costs
- no constituency
support for
disinfl ationary
policies
Partial Autonomy
(1996 Amendment)
1998-2002
government
(Fidesz+FKGP+MDF)
Present
- EU Membership
(accession talks
begin and end)
Low costs
-electoral support
for disinfl ation
Strong Autonomy
( July 2001 Act)
Th e closure of negotiations in 2002 and subsequent entry of Hungary into the EU 
in 2004 does not, however, mean that its obligations ceased to exist.  Since the new wave 
of accession, the countries have had no right to opt out of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), so Hungary was not only required to fulfi ll the accession criteria but also conduct 
an economic policy compatible with the EMU upon its accession to the EU. 37
37  As explained in Article 109 of the treaty establishing the EC and as defi ned in protocol 6 of 
that treaty, these criteria comprise of: 1) Th e infl ation criterion (an infl ation rate not more than 
1.5 per cent higher than those of the three best performing EU countries over the latest twelve 
months). 2) Th e fi scal convergence criteria (a country that wants to participate in the EMU may 
not have a government budget defi cit higher than 3% of GDP or a government debt ratio of 
more than 60 per cent of GDP). 3) Th e interest rate criterion (an average nominal long term 
interest rate that does not exceed by more than two percentage points that of the three best 
performing members states in terms of price stability). 4) Th e exchange rate criterion (participa-
tion in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System within the 
normal fl uctuation margin without severe tensions for at least two years). Th e offi  cial treaty is 
available at the EU’s website http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.
html. For a good discussion on the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact and the criti-
cisms to the Pact, see Gabor Orban & Gyorgy Szapary, “Th e Stability and Growth Pact From 
the Perspective of the New Members”, MNB Working Paper, No. 4, 2004; and Laszlo Csaba, 
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Th e Hungarian governments throughout the fi rst half of the 2000s failed to 
comply with the EMU criteria as the government budget defi cit remained well above 
the 3% reference value. Th e Hungarian governments had no genuine interest in joining 
the Euro zone as there was signifi cant opposition in Hungarian society to adopting the 
Euro, due to adverse eff ect it would have on economy.38 Th e European Central Bank 
(ECB), on the other hand, was hesitant to admit new states to the Euro zone as it had 
concerns about the impact of these less-developed transition economies on the stability 
of the monetary union.39 Th is article holds that international institutions are likely to 
exert pressure on domestic governments via material incentives, when domestic actors are 
willing to conclude an agreement with the international institution to obtain the incentive 
it off ers (see Table 3). Th e shallow commitment of Hungary to the monetary union meant 
that international incentives were no longer present to keep the Hungarian governments 
on a path of tight fi scal discipline in the aftermath of the accession.
What happened to the institutional autonomy of the MNB once the material 
incentives were removed from the table in the post-accession era? As this article argues, 
the government did not hesitate to oppose the MNB`s autonomy, when the bank’s posture 
clashed with the government`s economic strategy. As the ruling politicians diverged from 
tight budget discipline and criticized high interest rates, the government deemed strong 
autonomy of the MNB to be costly. When the left-liberal coalition government under 
Medgysessy opted for expansionist fi scal policies at home, the MNB’s eff orts to pursue 
disinfl ation turned the bank into a political target for the government.40 Th e two had 
diff erent views on monetary policy too. While the government demanded lower interest 
rates for a more competitive forint, the MNB insisted on high interest rates to control 
domestic demand and lower infl ation. Indeed, this diff erence proved to be costly for 
Hungarian economy. Th e insistence of the MNB on tight monetary policy in the absence 
of a credible disinfl ation commitment by the ruling government magnifi ed hot money 
infl ows and caused speculative attacks on the forint in 2003 and 2004. Medgysessy began 
to view the governor of the MNB more as a political opponent than as an offi  cial of an 
autonomous state institution, pursuing the task assigned to him by law. 
Th e government could not openly attack the economic independence of the bank 
since it would attract sharp criticisms from the EU. Th us, the government decided on 
an indirect way of controlling the MNB by increasing the number of its representatives 
in the decision making council of the MNB. Soon after the accession in May 2004, the 
government enacted a new legislation on central bank in December 2004, which extended 
“Ready, Steady, Go? How Prepared Are the New EU Members for Full Integration?”, Intereco-
nomics, Vol. 39, No. 2, March/April 2004, p. 69-75.
38 EOS Gallup Europe, Introduction of the Euro in the New Member States, Wave 2, Brussels, Euro-
pean Commission.
39 For a good and detailed discussion on this issue, see Juliet Johnson, “Two-Track Diff usion and 
Central Bank Embeddedness: Th e Politics of Euro Adoption in Hungary and the Czech Re-
public”, Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 13, No. 3, August 2006, p. 361-386.
40 Th e government that was composed of the leading left-wing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) and 
the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats (SZDZ) under Medgyessy`s premiership stressed more re-
sponsiveness to welfare considerations at domestic level. Th us, MSZP leader Medgyessy was willing 
to tolerate a somewhat higher infl ation to mitigate the pressure on welfare issues. Th e MNB, however, 
supported tight fi scal policy for price stability. For details see Greskovits, “Th e First shall be”.
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the Prime Minister’s authority to appoint members to the monetary council. With this 
new law, the Medgyessy government was able to alter the balance of power between the 
MNB and the government to its advantage.41
Conclusion
Th is article demonstrated that international organizations play a key role in triggering 
central bank reform with the material incentives they yield, when Hungarian politicians 
are reluctant to undertake this reform. Th e extent and pace of central bank reform, however, 
is determined by its political costs in the calculations of ruling politicians. Th is article 
challenges the competing rationalist-constructivist approach of Epstein on the grounds 
that the attempts of the Antall government to preserve the oversight of monetary policy 
as much as possible with the 1991 central bank reform demonstrates that Antall was not 
so ‘uncertain’ about what best served his interests and he was not so ready to give in to 
the demands of international institutions for social approbation. Th e shift from partial 
to strong autonomy in Hungarian context occurred when the government was able to 
construct an infl ation-averse coalition and implement strict fi scal policies in the early 
2000s that helped lower the costs of furthering statutory power of the MNB. 
Th e strong autonomy of the MNB became subject to political attacks when 
the accession to the EU in 2004 removed all the incentives from the table and raised 
the costs of tolerating the MNB`s power for the government. Electoral demands for 
less tight monetary policies raised the political costs of CBI and led to a clash between 
the government and the MNB due to the latter’s insistence on not lowering interest 
rates. In the absence of international incentives, the clash led to circumscription of the 
institutionalized power of the MNB with the 2004 December Act.
As central bankers of the post-communist EU states press strongly for a rapid adoption 
of the Euro, while the political leaders remain reluctant, the tension between governments and 
central banks can trigger political attacks on the institutional power of the latter, as in the case 
of Hungary in 2004. In the absence of the EU’s ability to withhold membership, compliance 
with the tough conditions of the Stability and Growth Pact make governments confront their 
central banks that insist on a rapid European Monetary Accession (EMA) through tight fi scal 
and monetary policies. Hence, the issue of central bank autonomy continues to matter in the 
post-accession period as it is subject to further challenges and amendments in this new era.42 
A broader academic challenge for the future is to examine how the political battle of central 
bank states will result for the bank’s statutory autonomy.
41 Th e new amendment expanded the size of the MNB`s Monetary Council from 9 to 13 mem-
bers, where four new members would be personally appointed by the Prime Minister.
42  For further reading on the power of the MNB in the euro age, see Bela Greskovits, “Estonia, 
Hungary and Slovenia: Banking on Identity”, Kenneth Dyson and Martin Marcussen (eds.), Central 
Banks in the Age of the Euro: Europeanization, Convergence and Power, Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2009, p.203-221.  For further readings on Europeanization and central bank literature, refer to 
Juliet Johnson and Rachel Epstein, “Uneven Integration: Economic and Monetary Union in Central 
and Eastern Europe”, Journal of Common Market Studies, volume 48, no. 5, 2010, p.1235-1258; Juliet 
Johnson and Rachel Epstein, “Th e Czech Republic and Poland: Th e Limits of Europeanization”, 
Kenneth Dyson and Martin Marcussen (eds.), Central Banks in the Age of the Euro: Europeanization, 
Convergence, and Power, p. 221-240 and Rachel Epstein and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Beyond Condition-
ality: International Institutions in Postcommunist Europe after Enlargement,” Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 6, September 2008, p.795-805.
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